The Determinants of Organizational Form Changes: Evidence and Implications from Real Estate by Damodaran, Aswath et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration 
The Scholarly Commons 
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection 
1997 
The Determinants of Organizational Form Changes: Evidence and 
Implications from Real Estate 
Aswath Damodaran 
New York University 
Kose John 
New York University 
Crocker H. Liu 
Cornell University, chl62@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Damodaran, A., John, K., & Liu, C. H. (1997). The determinants of organizational form changes: Evidence 
and implications from real estate[Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, 
School of Hospitality Administration site: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/247 
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection 
at The Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized 
administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact hotellibrary@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Determinants of Organizational Form Changes: Evidence and Implications 
from Real Estate 
Abstract 
We study changes in the real estate industry among organizational forms with varying degrees of 
restrictiveness and document the associated changes in profitability, free cash flow, debt, dividends, and 
investment policies. All troubled firms in our sample move to a more flexible organizational structure, with 
subsequent reductions in dividends, improvements in performance, and increases in asset sales and 
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The Determinants of Organizational Form Changes: Evidence and 
Implications from Real Estate 
Aswath Damodaian, Kose John, Cracker H. Liu 
Leonard N. Stern School of Business. New York University 
We study changes in the real estate industry among organizational forms with varying degrees 
of restrictiveness and document the associated changes in profitability free cash flow debt, dividends. 
and investment policies. All troubled firms in our sample move to a more flexible organizational 
structure, with subsequent reductions in dividends improvements in performance and increases in asset 
sales and investments. Healthy firms that move to a tighter structure have larger free cash flows before 
the change; they increase dividends reduce free cash flows and improve profitability after the change. 
We document evidence of tax considerations in organizational changes. 
Introduction 
Real estate firms can choose among a wide variety of organizational forms. At the one extreme, 
real estate investment trusts (REITs) have mandatory payout requirements and restrictions on 
investments and asset sales, but offer tax advantages to their investors. In contrast, real estate 
corporations have ‘looser’ structures with few constraints on managerial policy, but expose their 
investors to double taxation and potential agency costs arising from greater management discretion 
over excess cash flows. In between, there are organizational forms such as master limited partnerships 
(MLPs) and business trusts, which share some characteristics with both REITs and corporations. This 
variety gives us a unique opportunity to evaluate the tradeoffs in choosing among organizational forms. 
We examine all real estate firms that changed organizational form between January 1966 and 
December 1989 and categorize organizational form changes as shifts to either a looser (less restrictive) 
structure or to a tighter (more restrictive) structure. We also categorize these changes according to 
whether or not the organizational form change is accompanied by a change in the tax status of the 
entity. We then document the characteristics of firms that make changes from one organizational form 
to another. In particular, we study changes in performance, asset sales, investment, dividends, free cash 
flow, and leverage that accompany the change in organizational form. We find that firms in financial 
trouble are much more likely to change from tighter organizational forms (such as REITs) to looser forms 
(such as corporations), and to take full advantage of the resulting flexibility gained to restructure their 
assets and sharply curtail dividends. In contrast firms that change from looser to tighter organizational 
forms tend to have significant operating cash flows, and increase dividends following the organizational 
change. 
In our sample, organizational form choices seem to be based on the tradeoff between the 
entity-level tax benefits on the one hand and organizational flexibility with regard to dividend payouts, 
debt, and investments, on the other. The reasons given by the corporations themselves also highlight 
tax considerations and dividend, investment, and financing flexibility. However, the previous finance 
literature has emphasized the structure of contracts and the associated agency problems as important 
determinants of organizational form choice (see Alchian, 1950; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b). Agency 
costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with 
conflicting interests plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of enforcing contracts exceeds the 
benefits (see Jensen and MeckIing, 1976). 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the special features of a real estate 
investment trust that make it a more restrictive organizational form than a corporation. In Section 3, we 
describe our sample and methodology and present our findings. Section 4 concludes. An Appendix 
provides two case studies of organizational form changes. 
Institutional Background 
Table 1 presents some salient features of the organizational forms examined in this study. These 
include REITs, MLPs, business trusts, and real estate corporations. As Table 1 shows, there are several 
key differences among the various organizational forms. The first has to do with taxation. The income 
produced by REITs and MLPs is taxed only at the investor level. In contrast, corporations and business 
trusts are taxed at both the entity level (on income) and at the investor level (on dividends). The second 
key difference concerns investment and dividend policy restrictions. REITs are required by statute to pay 
out 95% of their earnings as dividends, and are restricted on the kinds of investments and divestitures 
that they can make. MLPs and business trusts have fewer restrictions on both investment and dividend 
policy, while corporations, generally speaking, are not restricted on either. 
The third key difference concerns managerial discretion over cash flows. The legally mandated 
requirement to pay out 95% of their earnings as dividends and the restrictions on investment policy 
associated with the REIT organizational form severely limit managerial discretion over the disposition of 
the firm’s cash flows (see Jensen, 1986). In contrast, managers of corporations have significantly greater 
power over the cash flows generated by their firms. Since most MLPs specify minimum cash payouts in 
the partnership agreement (see Moore et al., 1989). they provide for less managerial flexibility than the 
corporate form but more flexibility than the REIT. Business trusts move further up the continuum 
towards more managerial flexibility. 
Based upon these characteristics, we classify changes in organizational form as shifting to either 
a looser structure or to a tighter structure. We classify the following changes as shifts to a looser 
structure: REIT to business trust, business trust to corporation, REIT to corporation, REIT to MLP, and 
finite REIT (FREIT) to MLP. The other shifts, i.e., corporation to REIT, corporation to MLP, and MLP to 
REIT, are classified as shifts to a tighter structure. 
The trade-off in organizational form is between the greater tax benefits and reduced agency 
problems associated with organizational forms such as REITs, and the restrictions on investment and 
dividend policy that come with these benefits. In general, we would expect firms that are losing money 
and have negative cash flows to value flexibility more than any loss of tar benefits and increased agency 
problems, and thus be more likely to shift from a tighter organizational form to a looser one. We would 
expect firms with large earnings and positive cash flows to give much more weight to single-taxation 
benefits and agency problems than to the value of flexibility, thus making it more likely that they will 
shift to a tighter structure. 
 
Table 1 
Organizational Structure for Real Estate Firms 
 REIT MLP Business Trusts Corporation 
Management Centralized 
direction or 
trustees are 
entrusted with 
protecting the 
interests of 
shareholders. 
Trustees are 
subject to 
annual review 
and reelection. 
Advisory 
contract is also 
Centralized by an 
operating company. 
Difficult to change 
the general partner 
(GP) in absence of 
provable fraud. GP 
has virtually 
autocratic powers. 
Trustees 
manage the firm 
and have a 
fiduciary 
responsibility to 
protect the 
shareholders. 
Centralized 
directors are 
entrusted with 
protecting 
shareholder 
interests. 
renewable 
annually. 
Organizational 
Control 
Must have at 
least 100 
shareholders 
with no more 
than 50% of 
shares held by 
five or fewer 
individuals. 
Limited partners (LP) 
cannot own 20% or 
more of the stock of 
the GP or any of its 
affiliated companies. 
GP must have at least 
10% of the MLP’s 
total capital 
contributions. GP 
must have at all times 
at least 19% in each 
materiel item of 
partnership income, 
gain loss, deduction, 
and credit. 
No restriction 
on the number 
of shareholders 
who can control 
50% or more of 
the business 
trust. 
No restriction on 
how many 
shareholders can 
control 50% or 
more corporate 
Shares. 
Voting Rights of 
Shareholders 
Shareholders 
have the right to 
vote on certain 
matters 
affecting the 
REIT, including 
election of 
directors or 
trustees. 
Shareholders do not 
have any inherent 
voting rights or the 
tight to review 
partnership’s books 
and records. Full-
fledged rights are 
generally conferred 
at the GP’s discretion. 
State securities 
partners. Some as the 
right to remove GP or 
assets. 
Beneficiaries are 
not entitled to 
vote on business 
matters end 
have no say in 
choosing 
management. 
Beneficiaries 
become 
personally liable 
for obligations 
of trust as 
partners unless 
they relinquish 
all control over 
management. 
Beneficiaries are 
not allowed to 
choose the 
trustees. 
Shareholders are 
entitled to vote on 
business matters 
and have a say in 
selecting the 
management. 
Continuity Perpetual life 
except for 
FREITS. The 
rationale for 
FREITs is that 
they are more 
likely to track 
closely to the 
fair market 
value of the 
underlying real 
No continuity of life if 
subject to state 
statute 
corresponding to 
Uniform Partnership 
Act. Typically has a 
life of 100 years. If 
more than 50% of 
partners’ capital or 
ownership interests 
are sold or exchanged 
No continuity of 
life. The trust 
must have a 
maximum 
duration like a 
partnership. 
Unlimited/perpetual 
life. 
estate. in a ship is 
terminated for 
income tax purposes. 
Transferability/Liq
uidity 
Shares are 
freely bought 
and liquidity 
sold on an 
exchange. 
Theoretically, an MLP 
cannot have more 
than 50% of the units 
change hands each 
year or it no longer 
qualities as a 
partnership. Shares 
are freely bought and 
sold on an exchange. 
Shares are 
freely bought 
and sold on an 
exchange. 
Share are freely 
bought 
and sold on an 
exchange 
Stockholder 
Liability 
Limited 
stockholder 
liability. 
Stockholders 
are not 
personally liable 
if the firm is 
unable to pay its 
debts to claims 
against 
shareholders 
Limited liability for 
limited partners but 
not for general 
partners.  The general 
partner of the MLP 
has unlimited liability. 
Limited liability 
for 
beneficiaries, 
but trustees are 
personally liable 
for all business 
debts unless 
either the 
declaration of 
trust specifies 
that unlimited 
liability will not 
.attach to 
trustees, or the 
other party to 
the transaction 
agrees to look 
solely to assets 
of the trust. 
Beneficiaries 
become 
personally liable 
for debts of 
trust if they 
exert any 
control over 
trustees. 
Limited stockholder 
liability. 
Stockholders are 
not personally liable 
if the firm is unable 
to pay its debts. 
Corporate assets 
cannot fall to claims 
against 
shareholders. 
Taxation Not taxed at 
firm level if REIT 
meets certain 
requirements. 
Cannot serve as 
a conduit for 
losses since 
operating losses 
cannot be 
Treated as a 
corporation, Except 
for MLPs publicly 
traded on 12/17/87, 
which are exempt 
through 1997, and 
MLPs investing in 
certain activities, 
notably real estate 
Treated like a 
corporation for 
tax purposes. 
Subject to double 
taxation once at 
firm level and again 
at shareholder level. 
Proceeds are 
treated as portfolio 
income or loss for 
tax purposes.  Can 
carry losses back 
passed through 
to shareholders 
as capital gains. 
Proceeds are 
treated as 
portfolio income 
or loss for tax 
purposes. REITs 
are only allowed 
to carry losses 
forward for 
eight years. 
and oil and gas. For 
these MLPs, no 
double taxation exists 
Proceeds are treated 
as passive income or 
loss for tax purposes. 
Since 1987 income 
from a MLP can only 
offset losses from 
that same MLP. Louts 
from an MLP may 
offset only later 
income from that 
same MLP. A 
partner’s share of 
partnership income is 
taxable whether or 
not his share of any 
cash is distributed. 
three years and 
forward five years.  
Cannot pass 
through losses to 
investors. 
Dividend Payout 
Income (Earnings) 
Must distribute 
at least 95% of 
taxable to 
shareholders. 
Distribution of 
more than 95% 
is possible 
because 
depreciation is 
en expense. 
REITs hove the 
option of 
distributing 
capital to 
investors but a 
REIT is the gains 
are not 
distributed. 
High payout ratio is 
likely, since the 
partners pay tax 
whether the income 
is retained or not. 
However, there is no 
requirement that an 
MLP must distribute a 
certain proportion of 
income. 
No dividend 
payout 
requirement. 
Management is 
free to decide 
the best use of 
corporate 
income.  
Shareholders 
cannot exert 
control over 
management 
regarding 
payout. 
No requirements. 
Shareholders have 
no right to compel 
the corporation to 
distribute income to 
them. Management 
is free to decide the 
best use of income. 
Restrictions on 
Business 
Must derive 81 
least 75% of its 
gross income 
from real estate. 
Income from 
the sale of 
securities held 
less than one 
year or real 
estate held less 
than four years 
No restrictions on 
business operations. 
Can engage in the 
real estate trade or 
business, e.g.. can 
actively build, buy, 
and sell properties. 
No restrictions exist 
on the management 
or sale of MLP 
properties. 
No restrictions 
on business 
activities except 
those prohibited 
in the activitty’s 
declaration of 
trust. 
No restrictions on 
business exapt by 
corporate charter. 
must be less 
than 30% of a 
REITs income. A 
REIT cannot 
operate a 
business, 
develop. or 
trade 
properties. nor 
can it sell more 
than five parcels 
a year. Prior to 
the 19X6 TRA, a 
REIT had 
properties. 
Reserves Cannot 
accumulate 
reserves to 
meet special 
needs because 
REITs must 
distribute 95% 
of their taxable 
income. REITs 
need to raise 
additional 
money for 
growth either by 
secondary stock 
convertible and 
fixed-term debt. 
Can accumulate 
reserves to meet 
special needs. Due to 
the single taxation 
structure of an MLP 
more income is left 
for reinvestment than 
if the business were 
operated as a 
corporation. 
Can accumulate 
reserves since 
the trustees 
have the 
discretion to 
distribute 
earnings. 
Can accumulate 
reserves to meet 
special needs. 
Acquisitions Cannot enter 
into tar-free 
exchanges for 
properties it 
washes to 
acquire. 
Can trade its 
units/shares for real 
estate with the seller 
deferring taxes on 
the trade until he 
sells the MLP units. 
No information 
could be found. 
No information 
could be found. 
 
Reasons Given by firms for Changes in Organizational Form 
Many firms provide reasons when announcing an organizational change. Table 2 summarizes 
the reported reasons, which we culled from Wall Street Journal and Broadtape announcements. If the 
firm did not report a reason for the organizational change in either the wall Street Journal or the 
Broadtape, we contacted the firm to see if a reason could be obtained. In some cases, the firm refused 
to give a reason. The total number of firms in each category is also reported in Table 2 
Table 2 reveals that the most common reason given for switching to a looser structure is the 
need for more flexibility in investment and divestiture decisions. Prior to the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the 
use of tax-loss carryforwards to offset present or future income was also cited as a reason for switching. 
There are some differences, however, between nondistressed and distressed firms that move to a looser 
structure. Distressed firms are more likely, relative to nondistressed firms, to cite the wish to engage in 
enterprises other than real estate such as manufacturing or retailing. Distressed firms are also more 
likely to say that financing reasons such as restrictions in the debt restructuring agreement, removing 
restrictions on additional borrowing, and/or avoiding bankruptcy are making the change in 
organizational form necessary. Nondistressed firms, in contrast to distressed firms moving to a looser 
structure, are more likely to cite a relaxing of investment restrictions and hence an increase in their 
investment opportunity set. They are also likely to mention their wish to engage in prohibited real 
estate investments, such as the development and sale of properties. Thus, the type of flexibility desired 
differs for distressed and nondistressed firms. 
Firms switching to a tighter structure usually cite tax reasons. To a more limited extent, such 
firms also cite agency and cash flow reasons. The Appendix documents two case studies of 
organizational form changes to provide some perspective on the process by which real estate firms 
make organizational changes and the rationale advanced at the time of the change. 
Sample Description, Methodology and Results 
Our sample includes all real estate companies that voluntarily converted from one 
organizational form to another during the period January 1966 to December 1989. We examined all 
REITs listed in various issues of the REIT Facebook for a change in organizational structure with both the 
dates of board of trustee/directors approval and shareholder approval obtained from either the Wall 
Sweet Journal, 10Ks, SEC proxy statements, and/or the Dow Jones Broadtape. Information on 
organizational restructurings was also obtained from issues of Audit Realty Stock Review and Moody’s 
Bank and Finance Manual (vol. 2). The latter sources also reported cases in which the change in 
organizational form did not involve a REIT, e.g., from a corporation to an MLP and vice versa. Each 
company in the sample traded on either the New York, American, or OTC exchanges between 1966 and 
1989 and has information available for the period on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
daily returns database and the COMPUSTAT quarterly database. There are 128 organizational changes 
during the period that fulfill these criteria and hence are included in our sample. There are 28 firms that 
made two organizational changes during the period, first from a REIT to a business trust and then from a 
business trust to a corporation. 
We classify the total sample according to several criteria. First, we examine the Wall Street 
Journal Index for the five-year period preceding a change in the firm’s organizational structure. We 
classify a firm as distressed if it experienced a net loss for each of the three years prior to the 
reorganization and one or more of the following events occurred during that three-year period: (a) the 
firm filed for protection under either Chapter 10 or 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act; (b) the firm missed 
two or more interest payments on classes of debt; (c) the firm asked banks and/or public debtholders to 
swap properties in forgiveness of debt; (d) one or more of a firm’s creditor banks refused to sign a 
revised credit agreement that the company stated was vital for continued solvency; (e) the board of 
directors decided to omit divider& or (f) the auditor gave a qualified opinion on the firm’s financial 
condition. 
Since all firms classified as distressed had negative earnings per share for at least three years, 
and 87% of the firms were in actual or technical default on bond payments, these firms were in serious 
financial distress. Thus, the firms that are classified as nondistressednon-distressed cover the spectrum 
from substantial to marginal health, a point to which we will return when we examine differences 
among nondistressed firms. 
Second, we define the organizational changes as shifts to a looser or a tighter structure, as 
described in Section 2.1. Table 2 provides the details of this classification as well as some interesting 
findings about the sample. For example, of the total sample of 128 organizational changes, 112 were to 
a looser structure and only 16 to a tighter structure. Moreover, the overall sample has more 
nondistressed firms (70) making organizational changes than distressed ones (58). Finally, about 25% of 
the nondistressed firms move to t tighter structure and the rest to a looser structure. In contrast, all of 
the distressed firms moved to a looser structure. 
Motivated by the change in the tax law in 1976 that allowed REITs to carry net operating losses 
forward, we create a third classification based on whether or not the organizational change occurred 
prior to 1976. Prior to 1976, taking advantage of accumulated net operating losses provided an 
additional incentive to switch to a corporate form. The importance of this reason for organizational 
changes can be examined by contrasting the pre- and post-1976 samples. 
The final classification consists of two subsamples, based on whether the organizational change 
results in a change in tax status from single to double taxation. A shift from a REIT to a corporation 
changes the tax status from single to double taxation; a change from a business trust to a corporation 
does not change the tax status since business trusts are also double-taxed. 
 
Effects of Organizational Change on Financial and Investment Policies 
In Section 2, we argue that a primary motivation for switching to a looser structure could be to 
gain contractual flexibility in financial investment and payout policies. Such flexible would be particularly 
valuable for a troubled firm coping with financial distress. On the other hand, the mandatory payout 
requirements and other constraints on investment policy could reduce agency costs for nondistressed 
firms with high free cash flows. Table 3 shows the changes in asset structure, financial leverage, and 
dividend policy that accompany a change in organizational form,. We report the cross-sectional averages 
for the pre- and post-change periods. 
There are no statistically significant changes in the average debt/equity ratios for the overall 
sample, which decrease from 3.00i n the pre-change period to 1.95 in the post-change period. 
Nondistressed firms moving to a looser structure maintain existing debt ratios, whereas those moving to 
a tighter structure decrease debt. Troubled firms also reduce debt after changing organizational form. 
These differences are not statistically significant, however. 
On average, after organizational changes, the dividend yields decline for the overall sample from 
an average of 8.15% to an average of 2.16%; this drop is significant at the 1% level. Nondistressed firms 
that move to a looser structure cut dividends significantly, with the average dividend yield decreasing 
from 4.31% to 1.27%. More than 70% of these firms stop paying dividends after the switch to a looser 
structure. Firms that move to a tighter structure increase dividends, with the average yield increasing 
from 2.61% to 10%. When firms are classified by health, nondistressed firms do not change dividend 
yields significantly around organizational changes, on average. On the other hand troubled firms cut 
dividends dramatically, with the average yield dropping from 12.68% to 0.07%. All but two of the 
troubled firms stopped paying dividends after the switch to a looser structure. 
Fig 1 summarizes dividends and operating income for firms switching to tighter and looser 
structures. Firms switching to a tighter structure have cash flows that are significantly higher than 
dividends before the switch, and greater Rarity between these two numbers afterward. The equalization 
is due to a drop in operating income and a significant increase in dividends. Firms switching to a looser 
structure have much smaller cash flows available for distribution. They pay dividends that are roughly 
equal to cash flows before the switch, and have much lower dividends after the switch. These results 
reemphasize our findings that there are gradations of health even among nondistressed firms. The 
healthier a firm, if health is defined in terms of cash flows available to meet financial obligations, the 
more likely it is to shift to a tighter structure. The less healthy a firm, the more likely it is to shift to a 
looser structure. 

 
 
In the last part of this analysis, we evaluate the investment and divestiture decisions of firms 
around organizational changes. Table 3 reports that asset divestitures(as a percentage of total 
assets)increase after organizational changes for the overall sample from 0.23% of the value of total 
assets before the organizational change to 1.66% afterward. Nondistressed firms switching to a looser 
structure report an increase in asset sales after the change, with divestitures increasing from 0.08% of 
total assets to 0.7%. Firms switching to a tighter structure report a drop in divestitures, but the change is 
small and not statistically significant. When firms are classified on the basis of health, both 
nondistressed and troubled firms increase asset sales, on average, after changing their organizational 
form. The increase is much larger for troubled firms switching to a looser structure.(from 0.33% to 3.8% 
of the market value of equity) than for nondistressed firms (0.12% to 0.47%). Thus, troubled firms are 
much more likely to use their newly acquired freedom to restructure assets. 
If the divestitures reported here had not been accompanied by new investments, these firms 
would have become smaller. However, there is evidence that these divestitures were offset by 
acquisitions and capital expenditures. On average, firms report an increase in new investments after 
organizational changes, with capital expenditures and acquisitions increasing from 1.11% of the market 
value of equity to 2.84%. Nondistressed firms switching to a looser structure increase investments from 
0.6% of the market value of equity to 3.06% a change that mirrors the divestitures reported above. 
Firms switching to a tighter structure report a decrease in new investments from 5.26% :o 2.05% of the 
market value of equity. Both nondistressed and distressed firms report increases in new investments 
after organizational changes, but again, the change is more dramatic for troubled firms. In summary, 
troubled firms switching to a looser structure seem to take advantage of their new flexibility by divesting 
themselves of a portion of their old assets and acquiring new assets. Nondistressed firms switching to a 
looser structure divest fewer assets, but also embark on major investments and acquisitions after the 
change. 
Overall, there is evidence that organizational changes are accompanied by changes in payout, 
investment, free cash flow, leverage, and asset divestitures that reflect the change in restrictiveness of 
the organizational form. Firms that switch to a looser structure pay smaller dividends and restructure 
their assets. These changes are most pronounced for troubled firms with partial liquidations of many 
such firms followed by a redeployment of the assets. Firms that switch to a tighter structure pay larger 
dividends and reinvest less of their cash flow in new projects. 
Organizational Changes and Tax Factors 
There are two tax-related issues that arise in the context of the organizational form changes 
studied here. The first is the shift from purely personal taxation (under the REIT structure, in which 
income flows to the investors and is taxed at personal tax rates, i.e., single taxation) to a mixture of 
entity and personal taxation (under the corporation structure, in which income is taxed at the entity 
level and dividends are again taxed at the personal level, i.e., double taxation). The tax advantage of 
personal taxation (i.e., single taxation) over a mixture of entity and personal taxation clearly depends on 
the personal and corporate tax rates involved and the payout policy of the double-taxed entity. The 
second issue is the prohibition on carrying net operating losses forward that governed REITs prior to 
1976,1 providing an incentive for at least some REITS with substantial net operating losses to shift to a 
corporate status in that period. 
We examine both issues by regressing the changes in financial policy against two dummy 
variables, one that measures whether the organizational change occurred prior to the tax law changes in 
1976 and another that measures whether the change in organizational form resulted in a shift in tax 
status from single to double taxation, with the following results (t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
where 
PER= zero if the organizational change happened after 1976, one if before 1976 
 
In terms of firm behavior after organizational changes, there are significant differences between 
changes in the pre-1976 period relative to the post-1976 period. Firms that changed organizational form 
prior to 1976 reduce dividends much more dramatically than firms that changed their organizational 
form after 1976, but make significantly smaller changes in asset structure, investing less in new assets 
and selling fewer existing assets. Thus, they took no advantage of the financial flexibility that the 
corporate form offered in terms of capital investments or divestitures, and concentrated instead on 
reducing dividends. The firms that made organizational changes prior to 1976 also take advantage of net 
                                                          
1 Prior to the 1976 Tax Reform Act a REIT was not permitted a net operating loss Furthermore. a REIT was not 
allowed to reduce its capital gains by ordinary losses If a firm intentionally de-REITed, the firm could carry that loss 
forward to a year in which it had to pay corporate taxes. After passage of the Tax Reform Act, REITs were allowed 
to carry losses forward or reducer net capital gains. A net operating loss could be carried forward for eight years, 
but not backwards Prior to 1976, REITs were allowed to change to a corporate form in one year and change back 
the next year. Under the Tax Reform Act a firm cannot make a new election for five taxable years. 
operating loss carry forwards. These facts seem to suggest that tax reasons dominated in the pre-1976 
time period. 
Firm Performance Before and After Organizational Change 
To evaluate firm performance before and after organizational changes, we examine three 
measures: net income/total assets, return on assets (defined as EBIT/total assets), and the cumulative 
abnormal return for the two years before the change and the two years after the change. (We scale the 
operating income by total assets because the dollar values are skewed by a few larger REITs.) For firms 
making organizational changes, Table 4 reports the cross-sectional means and standard errors of each of 
these measures for the pre- and post-change periods. There are two classifications, one on the basis of 
whether the shift is to a looser or a tighter structure and the other on the basis of financial health at the 
time of the change. The difference between the pre- and post-change measures is reported, with a r-
statistic testing for differences in means. 
There is a significant increase in profitability for the overall sample, with the average net income 
increasing from - S7.45 million in the pre-change period to - $0.24 million after the change, though the 
return on assets is unchanged. The difference is most dramatic for troubled firms many of which have 
large losses but are profitable afterwards. The improvement is significant both in dollars and in return 
on assets. For nondistressed firms, the increase is much larger for firms that go to a tighter structure 
than for those that move to a looser structure, though the improvement is not significant on the return 
on assets measure. 
We also perform the same analysis but correcting for overall changes in profitability for all REITs 
during each year, to adjust for any changes that might affect all REITs. For instance, if REITs are more 
likely to shift to a looser structure just before economic recoveries, there will be an improvement in 
profitability after the change, not because of the change per se but because of the economic upturn. 
This correction should also significantly reduce any autocorrelation that might exist in the annual data 
for individual firms. The results are similar. 
At the time of the change, nondistressed firms that switch to a tighter structure have 
significantly higher operating income as a percentage of total assets than firms that switch to a looser 
structure. The mandatory payout requirements of the tighter organizational structure force the firms 
disgorge some of this cash flow after the organizational change and consequently reduce agency costs. 
They may also benefit from avoiding double taxation on these cash flows. For obvious reasons, troubled 
firms have much smaller operating incomes than nondistressed firms. We find that nondistressed firms 
moving to a looser structure have much lower returns on assets than nondistressed firms those that 
move to a tighter structure, suggesting that the former may be relatively less healthy at the time of the 
change. 
 
We measure cumulative abnormal returns, which are measured for the two years prior to and 
after each change, based on betas from the 250 trading days prior to the pre-change and post-change 
periods. The pre-change period starts 521 days prior to the organizational change and ends 21 days 
before the change; the post-change period starts 21 days after the organizational change and continues 
until 521 days after the change. All firms that make organizational changes to a looser structure, 
whether nondistressed or troubled at the time of the change, have significant negative abnormal 
returns in the two years prior to the change and mildly positive abnormal returns in the two years after 
the change. Again, the change is most dramatic for troubled firms that shift to looser organizational 
structures, a finding that is consistent with those on net income and operating income. 
In summary, nondistressed firms that move to a tighter structure and distressed firms that move 
to a looser structure become more profitable and increase the value of their equity. Nondistressed firms 
moving to a looser structure do not do as well in terms of improving net income or return on assets, but 
they do increase the value of their equity in the aftermath of the change. The differences between 
distressed and nondistressed firms are neither dramatic nor statistically significant. Furthermore, 
nondistressed firms with high levels of operating income are much more likely to switch to a tighter 
structure to obtain the lower agency costs of free cash flow and the tax advantages associated with 
these organizational forms. 
Discussion of Results 
The evidence presented here is consistent with the hypothesis that firms do indeed trade the 
benefits of a tighter structure (tax benefits and reduced agency costs) against the restrictive constraints 
on investment and dividend policy that go with these structures. Thus, distressed firms that incur losses 
and have negative cash flows shift from tighter to looser structures, since the benefits of the flexibility 
gained far exceed the lost tax benefits and the increase in agency costs associated with such a move. 
The subsequent actions taken by these firms to restructure assets and curtail dividends provide 
consistent evidence, as does the improvement in stock price and profit performance after the change. 
At the other extreme, firms with large free cash flows switch from a looser to a tighter structure. 
They find the tax benefits and reduction in agency costs large enough to justify the loss of flexibility 
associated with these changes. Here again, these firms increase dividends and curtail investments after 
the change. 
The one group for which the tradeoff is more ambiguous includes the firms classified as 
nondistressed that switch from a tighter to a looser structure. The tax benefits lost and agency costs 
incurred as a consequence of the shift to a looser structure are smaller and are clearly offset by the 
benefits that come from the switch. This group can be broken up into two subgroups: those that change 
their organizational form prior to 1976 and those that change after 1976. Of the 44 nondistressed firms 
that switch to a looser structure, 25% make the switch prior to 1976. They all cite the carryforward of 
operating losses as the primary reason for the switch (see Table 2). These firms also tend to have much 
huger net operating losses as a percentage of total assets (10.5%) than the nondistressed firms that 
switch after 1976 (who average net operating losses amounting to only 3.5% of total assets).The 
nondistressed firms that switch to a looser structure after 1976 are profitable, on average, but much 
less so than the nondistressed firms that switch to a tighter structure. It follows that these firms, while 
increasing their tax exposure by switching to a looser structure, have low profitability and therefore do 
not pay very much in taxes. Presumably, they believe that their gains from increased flexibility more 
than offset this tax disadvantage. Again, this is borne out by the reasons given at the time of the change. 
The managers of the nondistressed firms that switch after 1976 cite the flexibility gained (in being able 
to invest more broadly in real estate) as the primary factor for the switch. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines changes by real estate firms among four types of organizational forms: 
REITs, MLPs, business trusts, and corporations. We classify our sample of organizational changes 
according to whether the change is to a looser or a tighter structure, and whether or not the firm is in 
financial distress at the time of the change in organizational form. We document the changes in free 
cash flow, leverage, dividends, asset sales, and capital expenditure that accompany the organizational 
form changes, both for the overall sample and the subsamples. We also note the accompanying changes 
in equity value and other performance measures. 
We study whether there are systematic differences in value changes and changes in dividend 
leverage, and investment policies associated with organizational changes. We test to see if these 
differences are consistent with the increase or decrease in flexibility accomplished by the organizational 
changes. We find that all organizational changes made by distressed firms are to a looser structure. 
Firms switching to a looser structure pay substantially smaller dividends after the change and that they 
restructure their a sets, selling significant portions of their existing assets and acquiring new assets to 
replace them. These changes are more pronounced for distressed firms than for nondistressed firms. 
Firms switching to a tighter structure have significantly larger free cash flows before the switch and pay 
more in dividends after the organizational changes. However, they do significantly less asset 
restructuring than firms switching to a looser structure. 
We also find some evidence of taxes as a factor in organizational form changes. The dividend 
yield reductions associated with an organizational form change to a looser structure are more severe 
when the change occurs prior to 1976. In addition, organizational changes are followed by increased 
equity value and improvement in earnings for nondistressed firms moving to a tighter structure and 
troubled firms moving to a looser structure, with the increase being more dramatic for the latter group. 
Nondistressed firms that move to a looser structure lag both of these groups in stock price and earnings 
performance. 
In summary, firms are motivated to change to a looser organizational form to gain advantage of 
the greater flexibility, and to a tighter structure for the tax benefits. On average, at least, these changes 
seem to pay off in terms of increased profitability and stock prices. 
Appendix: Case Studies of Organizational Form Changes 
Tighter to Looser Organizational Form: Centennial Group/Midland Mortgage 
The Centennial Group commenced operations on May 5, 1969 as Midland Mortgage Investors 
Trust, a REIT making construction and other short-term mortgage loans. In order to obtain funds to lend, 
the REIT borrowed substantial amounts of short-term funds through bank lines and the sale of 
commercial paper in addition to the sale of subordinated debentures. In September 1974, the trust 
started to show early signs of financial difficulties, and reported that it had $19 million in nonearning 
investments which comprised 16% of its invested assets. 
By March 1975, Midland was able to negotiate a new revolving credit line with a syndicate of ?3 
U.S. banks for $102 million, in return for substantial restrictions on dividend and financing policy. In 
spite of this, nonearning investments increased to 43% of invested assets by April 1975. On July 25.1975, 
the board of directors of the trust recommended amendments to the declaration of trust allowing 
trustees discretionary authority not to qualify as a REIT for tax purposes. The intent was to give the 
trustees greater flexibility in operating and disposing of foreclosure property and to allow them to take 
advantage of tax-loss carryforward credits. The board also proposed reductions in interest and principal 
payments on outstanding debt, and the bondholders approved these proposals on November 11 t+. 
Three days later, the stockholders affirmed these amendments. 
The firm entered into an unsecured revolving credit agreement with its participating banks in 
July 1976, which allowed Midland to transfer assets to creditor banks in exchange for either canceling or 
reducing debt and cash. By the end of the year, the accounting firm of Ernst and Ernst gave the firm a 
qualified opinion due to uncertainties as to whether the firm could maintain this credit agreement and 
also maintain a minimum of $1 million in shareholders’ equity. 
On June 15, 1981, the firm announced that it would seek shareholder approval to change from a 
business trust to a corporation because ‘the trust form of doing business is quite cumbersome’ (Wall 
Street Journal, June 198 1, p. 5). As part of this process, the firm also changed its name to the Centennial 
Group Inc. to reflect a change in emphasis to real estate development (Wall Street Journal, August 12, 
1981, p. 38). 
In many ways, the path adopted by Midland, which started as a REIT and moved progressively 
from that status to a business trust to a corporation, is mirrored by other firms that switch to a looser 
structure in our sample. 
Looser to Tighter Structure: Weingarten Realty Investors 
Weirgarten Realty Inc. commenced operations in 1948 to own and develop shopping centers 
and other commercial real estate primarily m the Houston area. On December 28.1984 the company’s 
board of directors approved a reorganization plan which was designed to qualify the company as a REIT 
(Weingarten Realty Investors, 1987 Annual Report). More specifically, the company created a holding 
corporation known as WRI Holdings to hold not only assets unsuitable for ownership by a REIT but also 
$3.5 million in cash and $26832000 in debt securities (Weingarten Realty Investors, Notice of Annual 
Meeting of Shareholders, May 26, 1988). The firm received $26832ooO in mortgage bonds and voting 
and nonvoting common stock of WRI Holdings, Inc. in exchange for these net assets. The company also 
entered into a management contract with the Weingarten Realty Management Company to manage its 
properties as part of the plan. 
The board of directors sought REIT status given their belief that this changeover would reduce 
taxes and administrative expenses for an annual savings of approximately $575000 (Weingarten Realty 
Investors, Proxy Statement, February 12, 1988). The company completed its initial public stock offering 
(IPO) in 1985 and was taxed as a REIT starting in that year. Goldman, Sachs, and Co., the lead 
underwriter of the IPO reported that 3.75 million common shares of the REIT were sold , at $19.5O each. 
Of the total 2.6million shares were sold by the company and the rest by the shareholders. The company 
used its portion of the proceeds from the IPO to reduce short-term debt. The voting and nonvoting 
common stock that the company received from WRI Holdings was distributed to the company’s 
shareholders in 1985. On March 22, 1988 the shareholders formally approved the conversion of the 
company from a Texas corporation to a Texas REIT. The company’s predecessor entity, Weingarten 
Realty, Inc., transferred all remaining assets and liabilities to the new REIT in exchange for shares. The 
distribution of shares to shareholders was made on the basis of one trust share for each share of 
common stock. The IRS deemed this transfer to be a nontaxable event to both the firm and its 
shareholders. 
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